EXHIBIT 1b

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

DONALD MORISKY

Case No.: 2:21-CV-01301-DWC

MMAS RESEARCH, STEVEN TRUBOW, DUSTIN MACHI RODNEY WATKINS

DECLARATION OF RODNEY WATKINS IN SUPPORT OF **DEFENDANTS**

- I, RODNEY WATKINS, make the following declaration.
- 1. I am over 18 years of age, of sound mind, and otherwise competent to make this Declaration of my own personal knowledge.
- 2. I am a Certified Public Accountant (CPA). I live and work in Coronado,
- 3. I have served in the position of CPA for MMAS Research LLC and Steven Trubow since June 2018 to the present.
- 4. I hereby declare the truth for the following facts concerning my accounting services for MMAS Research LLC and Steven Trubow for the period following the execution of their CR2A settlement agreement with Donald Morisky.
- 5. To prepare this Declaration, I have reviewed all the financial records in my

possession.

- To the best of my knowledge, As of May 22, 2024, the total assets of MMAS Research LLC were \$2510.00 (See Umpqua Bank Letter)
- 7. To the best of my knowledge, As of May 22, 2024, the total assets of Steven Trubow were \$5414.44 (See Umpqua Bank Letter)
- To the best of my knowledge as of May 22, 2024, Neither Steven Trubow or MMAS Research LLC had any credit card accounts or secured revolving credit loans.
- 9. To the best of my knowledge as of May 22, 2024, Neither Steven Trubow or MMAS Research LLC had any securable assets; property, stocks, bonds, life insurance, or retirement accounts to borrow against other than one seven-year-old automobile with a Blue Book Value of \$20,000.

(Signatures on next page)

DECLARATION OF RODNEY WATKINS - 2

1 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the 2 United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. 3 Executed on May 22, 2024. 4 5 6 7 8 9 Isl Patricia Ray Pennsylvania Bar# 10 31989 11 The Law Office of Patricia Ray 5 Old Mill Road, Freeport PA 12 16229 Telephone: 215-908-13 6810 raypatricia@yahoo.com 14 15 Isl Brett Harris Brett Harris, WSBA 16 #55680 VIRGO LAW LLC 17 119 1st Ave. S., Ste. 310 18 Seattle, WA 98104 19 Telephone: (206) 569-8418 Brett@virgolawseattle.com 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 DECLARATION OF RODNEY WATKINS - 3 Virgo Law LLC 28 119 1st Ave. S., Ste. 310



Umpqua Bank

201 Western Ave

Petaluma, CA 94952

05/22/2024

To Whom it may concern,

This letter verifies that, as of May 22, 2024, Steven Trubow has an account with Umpqua Bank. Below are the records related to the account:

Type of Account: Personal Checking

Account Number: 3968073514

Current Balance: \$5,414.44

Date Opened: 08/18/2022

Thank you,

Jesse Fuentes

Personal Banker



Umpqua Bank

201 Western Ave

Petaluma, CA 94952

05/22/2024

To Whom it may concern,

This letter verifies that, as of May 22, 2024, MMAS Research LLC has an account with Umpqua Bank. Below are the records related to the account:

Type of Account: Business Checking

Account Number: 4862260215

Current Balance: \$2,510.15

Date Opened: 08/19/2022

Thank you,

Jesse Fuentes

Personal Banker

1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
3	MODICKY
4	MORISKY,) No. 2:21-cv-01301 Plaintiff,) RSM-DWC
5	v. RSM DWC)
6	MMAS RESEARCH LLC, et al.,)
7	Defendant.)
8	
9	VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
10	OCTOBER 19, 2023
11	
12	Before the
13	Hon. David W. Christel
14 15	Appearing via videoconference from
16	United States Courthouse 1717 Pacific Avenue
17	Tacoma, WA 98402-3200
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	Jessica L. Turner, CCR No. 3187
25	Court Reporter Chehalis, Washington 98532
	1

APPEARANCES 1 2 For the plaintiff: 3 F. CHRIS AUSTIN 4 Wiede & Miller, Ltd. 10655 Park Run Drive, Suite 100 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 6 AMANDA BRUSS Bruss Legal PLLC 7 7550 East 53rd Plain, Unit 172464 Denver, Colorado 80238 8 9 For the defendant: 10 PATRICIA L. RAY David & Raymond International 11 Patent Group 108 North Ynez Avenue, Suite 128 12 Monterey Park, California 91754 13 BRETT CARLTON HARRIS Virgo Law Firm 14 119 1st Avenue South, Suite 310 Seattle, Washington 98104 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2

(The following took place on October 19, 2023:) 1 2 THE CLERK: Good morning. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington is now 3 in session. The Honorable David W. Christel 4 5 presiding. 6 THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. The Court 7 is hearing the case of Morisky v. MMAS Research LLC 8 and other defendants. Case number is 21-1301. 9 Counsel, please make your appearances, first 10 for the plaintiff. MR. AUSTIN: Yes. Good morning, your Honor. 11 12 Chris Austin and Amanda Bruss for the plaintiff, 13 Dr. Donald Morisky. 14 THE COURT: All right. Good morning to both of 15 you. Mr. Austin, are you going to take the lead today on oral argument? 16 17 MR. AUSTIN: We have divided these up since we divided them up in the briefing, so to some degree, 18 19 there will be a little bit of back and forth. 20 based on what Your Honor was looking for, I think I 2.1 probably have a little more than Ms. Bruss does in 22 our response today. But they will be topic by topic. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Very well. Thank you. And for the defendants. 24 25 MS. RAY: Hello, Your Honor. This is Patricia

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Ray. I'm representing the defendants. And also,
Brett Harris is here I believe. I will be doing most
of the speaking, but Mr. Harris may have some
information to add.

THE COURT: All right. Good morning, Ms. Ray.

And good morning, Mr. Harris.

This case, so also, we're obviously proceeding by Zoom. No portion of this hearing can be recorded in any way. We do have a court reporter who is reporting the proceedings this morning. We've also got some personnel from the court who are not participating but are listening in to today's proceeding.

Several motions are pending in this matter.

I'll list them for the record. We've got plaintiff's motion for further sanctions; that's at Docket 154.

Plaintiff's got another motion for sanctions at Docket 156. Plaintiff has a third motion for sanctions and contempt at Docket 158. There is a motion to stay, or in the alternative, to amend the scheduling order; That's docket 164. And then we've got defendant's motion under Federal Rule 54(b), Docket 162.

And it sounds like, Mr. Austin, you and Ms. Bruss received the email where I tried to

structure today's argument, so you've received that.

Ms. Ray, did you and Mr. Harris receive that email?

You are on mute, Ms. Ray.

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MS. RAY: Yes, we did. Yes, we did, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Good. Very well. I've looked at the motions, and I tried to structure it in a way that helped get to the argument in an efficient way. So I appreciate the fact that counsel have reviewed that and are ready to proceed in that way.

I'll just indicate we're going to have to take a break at 10:15 to 10:30. The Court has an earthquake drill that is happening today, and it just happened to occur right in that time frame. So when we do that, Counsel, you don't need to drop off the Zoom. You can just remain. But I will drop off and will go out of the session. I'm planning to return at about 10:30. So we will keep that in mind. We will just adjust as needed, so.

Well, with that, let's start with that first argument, which is the request for sanctions regarding the destruction of the laptop. I'll first hear from plaintiff on that. And I'll -- is that you, Ms. Bruss, or --

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MS. BRUSS: Yes, Your Honor. That would be me.

THE COURT: Okay. So please proceed.

MS. BRUSS: Thank you, your Honor. And I will say, the motion is -- our first motion at 154 was not limited to the laptop, although that was the primary issue in that motion. That motion was also based on a lack of production of documents, privilege log, interrogatories, and failure to appear at a deposition.

But as for the laptop issue, our argument, as we put forth in our brief, is primarily that the laptop contained information. We don't know the scope of that information. What we do know is that the defendant testified that all of the licensing documents, negotiation documents, settlement agreements, and things of that nature were on that laptop, were not produced, and were destroyed and then thrown away before we had an opportunity to review it but after we asked for the documents.

So from the timeline that we've been able to piece together way after the fact -- again, we weren't told any of this during the course while it was happening. We didn't know the laptop had the documents. We didn't know the laptop had been broken and was being held. We didn't find out it was thrown

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away until after it happened. But all of that had happened while we were filing motions to compel, while we're trying to meet and confer, while we were asking for documents.

So we believe that the fact that the hard drive was thrown away in the middle of motion practice tends to indicate that there was probably information on there that was useful to us. And at the end of the day, we don't know what was there, but we know we can't have that information anymore.

And so at this point, we are left without a large chunk of the evidence that we need to make our case through no fault of plaintiffs. We have been trying desperately to get this information since last fall, for over a year. And it wasn't until I think March, this last March that the hard drive is thrown away.

So from our perspective, you know, there's -while we understand technological problems happen,
laptops break, there is no way to know whether we
could have recovered the hard drive.

From the testimony that we had, it was the laptop broke because it was in a soft case instead of a hard case. Well, that would lead me to believe that a screen might be broken or a keyboard, but the

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hard drive itself should have been able to be recovered, but we don't know because we never got the opportunity to look at that. So that, coupled with the fact that, honestly, we are two years into this case and we still don't have financial documents, records of licensing, the bulk of what was asked for in this case. We still don't have it.

And at this point, we understand that there is a public policy, a desire to resolve cases on their merits. The problem is this case can't be resolved on its merits without the information that only defendants had. And they won't turn it over. They won't respond to document requests, interrogatories, depositions. They won't produce documents when ordered by to this Court. We still don't have a privilege log. So without compliance with discovery -- and then when this Court issued sanctions, they weren't paid. So we don't know what other recourse there is at this point.

So we understand that the ask that we're coming to you with is a big one. We do know that. But at this point, we don't know that it's appropriate for plaintiff to continue to spend money, time, and energy to get resolution on this claim when we are the only ones showing up.

THE COURT: So, Ms. Bruss, on that laptop, it sounds like you've identified some of the topics or categories of documents that were on there.

MS. BRUSS: Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: And are you stating to the Court that there is no other way to obtain those documents?

MS. BRUSS: We don't know -- I mean, from the defendant, presumably email correspondence, correspondence regarding the negotiation of settlements, negotiations about licenses, in theory, I suppose we could get them. I don't know who we would get them from; I guess defendant's attorneys, although those are defendant's agents and they should have produced them in response to discovery a year ago. But also, who are the licenses issued to? We don't know because we don't have that information. It wasn't produced in response to interrogatories.

So in theory, yeah, we could serve interrogatory. We could serve subpoenas on all the parties on the other side of those transactions, but we don't know who they are. And defendants won't tell us.

THE COURT: So it sounds like plaintiff is saying that you do know some of the categories of information that was on that laptop and that you

don't have any way to try to obtain them from a 1 2 third-party source; is that correct? 3 That's correct, Your Honor. MS. BRUSS: THE COURT: Okay. And in your motion, you're 4 moving, I think, under the Court's inherent authority 5 to impose sanctions. Are you also moving under 6 7 Federal Rule 37(e) on spoiluation of evidence? 8 MS. BRUSS: Yes, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: What is your argument on Rule 10 37(e), if you can summarize it for me? MS. BRUSS: Well, our argument is similar. 11 12 It's that the defendant knew that this information 13 was relevant and discoverable, was under a duty to preserve and disclose it, and didn't do that. And at 14 15 this point, you know, we don't have any other recourse to obtain these documents. 16 17 THE COURT: Okay. And in terms of sanctions, 18 you are asking the Court to -- case dispositive 19 sanctions I think is your primary request. What is 20 the alternative to that? 2.1 MS. BRUSS: Your Honor, that's the problem is 22 that we don't know that there is a viable 23 alternative. I mean, the other alternative would be 24 I suppose an order by this Court to produce this 25 information, but we've already done that. Or the

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Court could order sanctions to be paid, and we've already done that.

At this point, I don't know how we compel the other party who has access to these documents or the ability to recover some of them, we don't know how to get them to comply because nothing has worked thus far.

So, You know, in theory, also we could ask for a jury instruction that whatever was on the laptop would have been unfavorable to the defendants, but the problem is, we need these documents to show who the license -- who was issued licenses, what those licenses were for, the fees that were paid. We have no way of proving damages without any of these financial documents.

And while the defendants are saying now that there were not financial documents on the laptop, they still haven't produced financial documents, for the most part. But also the licenses would tell us how much was paid. We don't have that information. So that's -- that's crucial for us to either to also -- to make our case and also to prove damages.

So I don't know how an adverse inference would help. We don't have numbers. We don't have the facts that we need. We know that some licenses were

issued, but we don't know to who.

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THE COURT: And it sounds like you are saying you don't know to whom those licenses were issued and you don't know what revenues were produced, if any, as a result of those licenses and that plaintiffs have no other way to determine that information; is that plaintiff's position?

MS. BRUSS: Yes, Your Honor. We acknowledge that we could probably get some pieces of information if we subpoenaed defendant's agents, although we believe at this point that's not appropriate for us to have to spend more money trying to get documents that frankly are within the possession, custody, and control of the defendants and should have been produced a year ago. But even assuming that we are going to go down the road, reopen discovery, spend another year on the case and send out a bunch of subpoenas, I don't know that we would get a complete picture even through that process at this point.

THE COURT: So you wouldn't get a complete picture. How is it going to be shored? I mean, what -- because if you did some third-party subpoenas, you would get some information presumably; right?

MS. BRUSS: In theory, yes. We don't know

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because we didn't know we would even need to be sending out subpoenas during the discovery period here. So we need to start with figuring out who to send subpoenas to. I suppose defendant's attorneys, agents, their financial — their bookkeeper, which we didn't know. Apparently he has documents, so we could subpoena him. And then once we got those documents, we could go through them, send out new subpoenas to find information from the licensing partners, but again, we don't know if that's even going to get us anywhere, because we don't know if there were licensed issued to third parties where the attorneys weren't involved, for example.

THE COURT: Yeah. I understand that.

So at some point, plaintiffs learned about this broken computer, this lost laptop, and at that point you -- the plaintiff has not yet submitted any third-party subpoenas or made any other efforts to obtain the information that might have been on that laptop from any third-party sources; correct?

MS. BRUSS: That's correct. Discovery had already closed, and we had extended the discovery to be able to take defendant's deposition. And this Court had ordered production of a bunch of documents. So at the time, we had assumed or believed that

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defendants would comply with the Court's order and
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       produce documents. And so I guess in theory, we
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       could have served subpoenas, but I'm not entirely
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       sure who we would have served them on prior to the
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       depositions, because that was all happening when the
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       Court had already compelled defendants to produce
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       things.
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              THE COURT: Okay. So just to confirm, you
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       learned about the lost laptop after the close of
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       discovery; is that correct?
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              MS. BRUSS: Yes, sir. Yes, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right. Anything else,
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       Ms. Bruss, on the laptop?
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                         That's all I have, your Honor.
              MS. BRUSS:
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              THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Ray or -- Ms. Ray, are
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       you presenting on this one?
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              MS. RAY: Yes. Yes, Your Honor --
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              THE COURT: Just a second, Ms. Ray.
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              MS. RAY: (Audio disturbance.)
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              THE COURT: Ms. Ray -- Ms. Ray. Ms. Ray, we
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       can't -- your -- your connection is breaking in and
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             I can't -- I haven't heard anything you've
23
       said.
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              MS. RAY: Yes. Can you hear me?
25
              THE COURT:
                          I can hear you now, but I can't see
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1 you. 2 MS. RAY: All right. How about now? 3 THE COURT: Well, we can hear you, but I can't --4 5 MS. RAY: All right. Let's see. It says -- it says I'm on video. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. There you go. So now I can 8 see your video. 9 MS. RAY: Okay. All right. So, Your Honor, 10 this entire issue is blown up beyond proportion, that the idea of the laptop was mentioned by Mr. Trubow in 11 12 his deposition, but Mr. Austin, who was conducting 13 the deposition, didn't allow him to explain that the 14 laptop had broken years before. It was a dead -- a 15 dead laptop with very little on it except training 16 materials. When Mr. Trubow tried to explain that it 17 was used for training, he was cut off and he couldn't 18 explain. He said specifically there was no financial 19 documents on that laptop. It was simply a training 20 laptop. And it broke when it fell out of his backpack, 2.1 22 and then it fell apart. He put it in the garage and 23 later on threw it away. And it was no, like, 24 intentional act to hide discovery. There was pretty 25 much nothing there of interest on there. So the

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plaintiff's attorneys have used this to blow it up into a situation where they say they can't get evidence, so they use it as an excuse.

To redouble the situation, plaintiff's attorneys keep complaining that they can't get categories of document production. But, Your Honor, we have produced everything available. There really is very little in the licensing documents. There is nothing for a privilege log. There were no financial documents on that laptop, and Mr. Trubow contacted his -- during the deposition, contacted his accountant and had financial reports for the company produced and everything that we have has been provided.

If plaintiff's attorneys would like to go forward with other approaches to getting information they claim that they don't have, which we would provide if we had it, they should go ahead and do that. They should go ahead and do subpoenas to the joint representation attorneys. They should do subpoenas for the things they need -- they say they need to get, because starting in May, I've provided -- I went over the document request carefully with -- with the client and went through everything we could possibly get to produce, and we

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provided that. We sent them in categories, in emails to Mr. Austin. And then at Mr. Trubow's deposition, we went over those categories. There was questioning. We provided everything we could, and during the deposition as topics came up, we provided additional documentation. We went through everything that we could to give documents and answers to questions.

So at this point, the laptop, it had very little on it. It was inadvertently -- it died, so now we're -- we don't have anything else to provide to the Court. I mean not to the Court. Either to the parties. And the laptop issue is just completely an overblown excuse for -- it's a mountain out of a mole hill.

THE COURT: So, Ms. Ray --

MS. RAY: -- your Honor.

THE COURT: A question for you, Ms. Ray.

MS. RAY: Yeah. Sure.

THE COURT: I'm taking your client's testimony as being or as -- you're stating that your client would say that he did not know about this laptop prior to the deposition; is that correct?

MS. RAY: Not exactly. He knew that it was a broken laptop that he hadn't used for a long time and

had thrown it away.

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THE COURT: And do we -- I'm not clear on the record on this. Do we know at what point he threw away the laptop? I mean, for instance, was it before this case commenced? Was it before the closing of the discovery period? At what point did he throw it away?

MS. RAY: It was some point in his move, in his move in early 2023. It was during -- after the case had been filed, yes.

THE COURT: The case had been filed, and was discovery open at the time?

MS. RAY: I think discovery may have started. There was no discovery request made at that point, but discovery was -- I think it had been initiated.

THE COURT: And I think you said that he -- he knew there was information on that laptop which related to issues in this case; is that correct? Did he know that?

MS. RAY: He -- he said it had training materials on that, which I don't think he thought that they were relevant to the case, and the laptop was dead anyway. In his mind, it wasn't relevant.

THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Ray, on the issue of the laptop?

MS. RAY: Not for now.

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THE COURT: What about sanctions, Ms. Ray? I mean, the plaintiff is asking for case dispositive sanctions. Let's assume the Court decides that there should be some sanctions but not at that severity. What would you recommend as an alternative sanction if the Court heads in that direction?

MS. RAY: I would say that it would be appropriate to allow plaintiff to subpoena, so issue subpoenas to get information from other sources. don't know what information they want. We produced everything we have. So they might -- they might go forward with subpoenas to third parties, prior attorneys of the organization who might have some document -- who would have documents about the licensing of the Morisky widget or something like So I don't know what they are trying to get, that. because we provided everything we have. But they could go forward with third-party subpoenas. think that would be appropriate for them to get what they wish to find.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Ray.

Ms. Bruss, would you like to reply?

MS. BRUSS: I would, Your Honor. I won't take up too much time, but as far as whether the

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defendants knew the documents on the laptop were relevant, defendant raised the issue during his deposition when we asked for documents. So he knew that the documents on the laptop were relevant to the case because he brought it up and said, well, I don't have any of that. I had them on this laptop and it died. Actually, he said during his first deposition that he still had the hard drive.

In terms of timing, discovery had been well underway when he threw it away, because we were in the middle of motion practice. It was actually shortly after the Court had asked us to go meet and confer again on our motion to compel documents that the laptop was thrown away. It was on the eve of defendant's deposition or his originally scheduled deposition, and so frankly, should have been right in his mind about what he was preparing to testify for pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). So I don't think it's believable that he didn't know that those documents were relevant.

And frankly, it wasn't just training materials. The defendant testified during his deposition that the laptop had all of his licensing and settlement agreements there. So we -- and we submitted excerpts from that deposition to Your Honor. So they weren't

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just training materials, and the defendant knew that the information was on there that we needed, and then threw it away anyway during the middle of motion practice when we were filing the motion to compel.

So there is not any question on that.

In terms of, you know, just plaintiff, as a sanction, having to seek documents from defendant's attorneys and defendant's bank account, I just don't understand how that is a sanction against defendants. That's a cost plaintiffs are going to have to pay to do those things, and frankly, those documents are under the control of defendants.

THE COURT: Could the Court in that situation impose -- allow plaintiffs to do this third-party supplemental discovery, subpoenas and such, and then as part of the sanction, require the costs be paid by the defendant? I mean, why isn't that possible?

MS. BRUSS: Well, because defendant doesn't pay sanctions. We already have a sanctions order of thirty some thousand dollars they still haven't paid that this Court ordered last spring. So I don't -- yeah, in theory, the defense, I suppose, could assume the costs of all this additional discovery, but they are not paying for them. And they refuse to do so and said that they won't.

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So -- and also the other issue is, my client has a right to know the outcome of this case. At some point, he gets to be able to control his intellectual property. And while defendants are claiming this is ruining their business, it has made it impossible for our client to actually do anything with his IP. So putting it off for another year, it's not just a financial cost, and he's paying his attorney fees. We have to send out subpoenas, conduct depositions. That all costs money. I don't know -- I don't know that -- I suppose you could issue an order, but I don't believe it will be complied with, based on everything that has happened in this case.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. AUSTIN: Your Honor, just one clarification.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Austin.

MR. AUSTIN: The weekend -- just to give you the time here, in the deposition he testified that the laptop was thrown away the weekend of February 24th and 25th, which were the dates that the Court set for his deposition in Washington. And those dates we had to ask permission for because they were after the close of discovery.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Austin. Appreciate that.

All right. Let's move on to our next topic for today, which is the request for sanctions regarding the May 30th and May 31st deposition. Who is going to argue that for the plaintiffs?

Is that you, Mr. Austin?

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MR. AUSTIN: It is. Thank you, your Honor. So I think our briefing there too is pretty clear. This is kind of an unusual issue, I would imagine. I don't know that this comes up that often. But if you recall, Your Honor scheduled or compelled them to -- you know, doctor -- or Mr. Trubow to go forward with depositions, and they had to be completed by the 31st of May. That was the Court's order.

We, in anticipation of trying to make sure we had a buffer time to get that all done, scheduled the depositions on the -- I believe they were the 24th and 25th of May, so there would be some time.

And then further, because we directed to have these depositions at Your Honor's order, the parties could not agree on a location. So they were held at my office. And to accommodate travel, we started those depositions on the first day a little later in the day to make sure that it would be available.

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And I was hopeful we would be able to get them both done in those two days, but we did not. And so we had about a half day of additional deposition that needed to be taken after we completed what depositions we could do on the 24th and the 25th.

And the parties amicably scheduled to have that final deposition taken I believe on the 30th of May. And I agreed to do that remotely by Zoom, because at this point, everybody had the documents. We could probably do it over Zoom and everybody could look at the binders that I had provided to everybody. So I felt that would be doable.

And then I'm going to go to the timeline. I think that's in our briefing. Because I think that's really what it comes down to -- actually, I'm not going to do that. I'm just going to cut to the chase on it, because the key point is we received notice -- after we set this up, we sent them notice from the court reporter, which were the same court reporters that we utilized for the depositions at my office, so their contact information was already provided to defendant's counsel.

I forwarded to defendant's counsel the email I received confirming the start time of the deposition and the login that would be necessary to do it

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through Zoom and that was done a day -- more than a day in advance. On that email, when I scheduled it, it identifies -- and we've had this discussion before -- that there is a hard cut off deadline to avoid nonrefundable fees for scheduling a remote deposition or any deposition for that matter, because at that point, the court reporter can no longer fill that blank, that gap, and we're going to be obligated to pay a minimum fee.

We received notice from plaintiff's counsel after that nonrefundable deadline had passed the eve before the original scheduled deposition that had been extended by the parties on May 30th. And so I, recognizing that it -- you know, they are not -- I'm not going to challenge somebody who says they are ill. That's -- I'm not going to get into that discussion.

So my response was, again, to defendant's counsel. I've got a court order that's only extended me until the 31st to get this done. I am happy to get on a phone and immediately see if we can't get this pushed out or whatever you would like to do. But because you're letting me know now when the courts are closed, it's in the evening on the 29th, and we are set to start the next morning, I will call

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it off if you guys will, you know, if there is going to be no issue with you all paying the late cancellation or rescheduling fee.

And the response I -- and then you can go run to the Court, seek to do an emergency teleconference or whatever you need to do, and I will be available for that. And the response that I got from defense counsel, I think it was Ms. Ray, was sounds like a plan. Literally, quote/unquote, sounds like a plan.

So I went forward and rescheduled the deposition to the follow day, as I said I would do. I will schedule it to the 31st. That will give us a whole day to get in front of the Court to get this extended and, you know, then we can cancel it before the cut off, that deadline I think was 4:30 or four o'clock, something like that in the evening. And obviously, by that time, we would know or not know if the Court was going to grant the extension. I expected the Court would grant the extension. That was not my concern, but I don't have the unilateral power to do that.

And so I'm just telling her, here's what we need to do. I will do what I can to accommodate that time frame. I would rather it be rescheduled. I sent that information out first thing. We're talking

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seven o'clock, eight o'clock in the morning on the 30th and got no response for the rest of the entire day. In fact, never got a response until the following morning. And I repeatedly said, look, where are you at? I'm hanging by. You know, it's your burden to get ahold of the Court to seek the extension. No response at all.

And so the next -- I said I'm going to have to go forward the next morning and at least make a record. Here's the call in. You can call in and explain what happened on the record as well. She didn't respond. She didn't show up. Instead, the next morning, just as our court reporter -- as we're getting set up to do the Zoom conference and we are getting ready to go, I learn that they had filed a motion, a separate motion, not on an expedited basis to extend the discovery deadline based on the client being sick.

At which point my client has already incurred the fees for setting two depositions up. And that's what we are seeking to recover. It's kind of -- I guess, it's not a situation where I feel like there was necessarily bad faith. It was kind of neglect. You know, neglect is my concern here because at least one of those days the costs could have been readily

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avoided. And I wouldn't have rescheduled if they were not going to go through this process. I would have just said we will make the record on the 30th and then we will go forward and you can see what you can get from the judge at that point. But I went through the process with the intent of helping give them the space to get the extension and I feel like it's like, you know -- it's like I'm getting -- my client is getting punished because I tried to be accommodating. That's really what I feel like is happening here on the cost.

And the other problem is this. I mean, I feel for somebody who is sick and then can't make it to something. But you know what? If that happens to me and I didn't get insurance when I bought my airplane ticket, I still have to pay the cancellation fee. They don't give me an out even though I have a legitimate excuse. And that's all we're asking for here. We're not asking for any of my time that was associated with setting those depositions up or changing the scheduling. We're just asking for the out-of-pocket costs my client had to incur to reschedule these and pay the nonrefundable late cancellation fees.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Austin.

Ms. Ray.

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MS. RAY: Okay. Your Honor, I was trying to be accommodating too. We had conducted two gruelling days of deposition in Las Vegas, and we couldn't -- Mr. Austin couldn't finish his questioning, so we scheduled a continuation by Zoom. And it was all working out, very cooperative. I was trying to cooperate and be accommodating too. But this was Memorial Day weekend. And on Monday when we were off, Mr. Trubow, the deponent, contacted me and said he had gotten COVID from his trip to Las Vegas and he just couldn't get out of bed.

And I contacted Mr. Austin immediately and told him we would have to postpone. Could we postpone for two weeks and I would try to contact the Court and get some kind of extension so that we could conduct the continuation of his deposition that he wanted to -- the questionings that he wanted to do of Mr. Trubow. And I did my best to try to contact the Court, calling the clerk, calling everybody I could to see if we could get an extension for Mr. Austin's continued deposition.

THE COURT: Ms. Ray -- hold on, Ms. Ray. But you didn't file any -- you didn't file an emergency motion of any sort at the time.

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I did file a motion. Yes, I filed a MS. RAY: And nothing -- and motion for continuation. I did. I talked to Mr. Austin, and we -- it's not I wasn't accommodating or cooperating. We talked and he told me that I needed to file that motion, which I did. And he said you better do other things too, because the Court is not going to hear that right away. called the clerk of the court. I -- I just got no response at all from the Court and -- I actually emailed and contacted Mr. Austin numerous times. Не called me and left messages. It wasn't like we weren't in contact. I got nothing accomplished on that -- the day the deposition was scheduled. And we -- we -- I can't believe he would say I wasn't cooperating. We were in, like, almost constant contact.

So then I said, please put your deposition off for a couple of weeks because Mr. Trubow, the deponent, he has COVID. And that COVID is not going to be resolved for a couple of weeks. And we agreed on that.

But nonetheless, Mr. Austin rescheduled the depositions. On the second day, I called at the time of the deposition, put on the record that I had tried to reschedule it somehow and I wasn't able to do

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that. I did file a motion with the Court to postpone the depositions for a couple of weeks, but I didn't get any response. So I think it's really untrue that I was not in touch with him. It was untrue that I wasn't cooperating. I was totally accommodating, not to mention the fact that this was an entire accommodation to Mr. Austin to continue his two plus days of depositions, which we were completely willing to do but it just -- it couldn't be worked out. And I -- I think he felt compelled to schedule depositions, but they were like useless, because Mr. Trubow was flat in bed and couldn't -- couldn't testify.

So I don't know. I think it's a total mischaracterization that I wasn't accommodating or didn't cooperate. I filed a motion. I called the court. I was -- I was in constant, like, action trying to get this thing moved on, because we were trying to do it. So I think that's a mischaracterization.

THE COURT: Mr. Austin, at this point, have plaintiffs completed the deposition of Mr. Trubow?

MR. AUSTIN: Yes, Your Honor. You will recall that they did file their motion. And I apologize if Ms. Ray got the impression I was trying to say she

was not cooperative. She just wasn't responding in a manner that was timely enough to avoid us incurring late fees, the late cancellation fee. That was the point to what I was trying to make.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. AUSTIN: So but there was -- obviously, I was trying to email her and contact her. She did not contact me back and say she was -- she had, you know, I didn't hear about the issues with the Court until the following day, by which time the deadline to avoid late cancellation fees had passed. And I'm talking the day of the 30th, for the next day, the 31st, which was the day that we had scheduled the last deposition.

So the problem is -- and I don't know why she could not get ahold of the Court. That's -- seems to me that's not complicated. But in any event, that didn't happen on that end. As I said, I had no other choice. So it wasn't until the morning of the 31st that defendants filed their motion to continue the deposition, but that's already past the late cancellation deadline.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. AUSTIN: And it's right when we're beginning to take the record. So and I may be

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mistaken. I can go back and look whether or not she was there on the deposition. That's fine. That's not my point. My point is we incurred a cost here that we -- we didn't -- we wouldn't have incurred if she could have just made a call to the Court and asked to get this set up ahead of time or filed an emergency motion, let the Court know it's there, I think the Court would have responded very quickly, and that might well have happened.

Or at a minimum, she could have come back and said I couldn't get ahold of anybody. Let me know. I would still have had to go forward is the problem, because as you know, I can't unilaterally decide to just reschedule another deposition after discovery is closed, and I've only been given latitude to do it by the order of the Court to that day.

THE COURT: I understand.

MS. RAY: Your Honor, Your Honor, can I speak?
THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. RAY: Just in my personal defense, I called the clerk of the court, and they refused to set up any kind of conference. I couldn't do it. And I typed out a motion and filed it. I did all the things that Mr. Austin said I didn't do.

As a matter of fact, it's kind of personally

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offensive, because I was really trying to get this thing postponed because my client was sick. He couldn't do it. I did all the things he said I didn't do and Mr. -- I have even a voicemail from Mr. Austin saying, please do this, please do that. And this was all on his behalf. I wasn't trying to continue a deposition for myself or for my client. It was all for Mr. Austin. And for him to accuse me of not doing these things, just personally I'm hurt. And I really wish that everybody could understand, I did every possible thing I could do to get this postponed. And I begged Mr. Austin to put it off for two weeks, which actually occurred. In the end, the deposition got taken. Case closed.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel, for that argument. Let's move on to the next topic or category, which is the request for sanctions for defendant's failure to pay the previously ordered costs and fees on the motion to compel, which that's court order I think Docket 124 --

MR. AUSTIN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- is the order to compel. On the motion to compel. And then there is defendant's got a pending Rule 54 motion as well.

So, plaintiff, let's start with you. Who is

going to make those arguments?

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MR. AUSTIN: I'm going to make this argument as well, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. AUSTIN: So I think if you look at our motion in that case, we laid out -- if I can pull it up here -- I think a pretty clear timeline of the events that took place. But in quick summary, the Court entered its order granting the motion for sanctions and fees. We then briefed the amounts. The Court then entered an order I think on June 15th, which is Docket 141. And it laid out that there were a total amount of fees of \$33,525.92 and directed defendants to pay that within 30 days of that June 15th order. That would then fall on July 15th for them to pay it.

They didn't pay it. Instead, on June 26th, they filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit for this order, which is not appealable, you know, at that point. It's not an interlocutory matter that can go before the Ninth Circuit.

On July 11th, about four days prior to the deadline to pay, the Ninth Circuit entered an order to show cause stating that this is not a -- that this order to pay sanctions under 37 -- so this is a 37(a)

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sanctions grant -- is not appealable under 28 U.S.C.

Section 1291. So -- and then ordered them to follow
a -- yeah. Order to show cause why we shouldn't just
terminate the appeal because this is not an order

over which we have subject matter jurisdiction at the

Ninth Circuit. That's the nature of that particular
order. I believe we attached that to the motion -
THE COURT: You did.

MR. AUSTIN: -- as part of the process or we might have referred it to you, the Court. I can't remember if I did it by cite or if I did it by attaching the brief. It's been a bit of time.

But I do remember that the Court specifically cited to the Rosenfeld case, which is a Ninth Circuit binding precedent in which it specifically said that Rule 37(a) sanctions are generally not appealable.

They are not final so they are not appealable.

So they were given 21 days to comply with that Ninth Circuit order. In the interim, they -- you know, they asked for an extension on August 7th to have additional time to file that. And then in that interim period, they came to the Court and filed the Rule 20 -- the Rule 54 motion seeking to have this clarified as a -- as a final judgment, right, under Rule 54.

So that's kind of the timing on when this took place, but the problem is they never actually filed their -- their extended briefing. They never responded to the Ninth Circuit's order to show cause. And so on September 8th of this year, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal and issued an order stating that the mandate would issue and be -- and that this order would be the mandate within 21 days of that order, which was September 29th. So as of September 29, 2023, there is no appeal. It is -- the case is closed. The appeal is completely dismissed.

So then all that is -- so that gets you the kind of the background and the timing of it. And to date, after that happened, we then bring this motion because there has not been a payment and there has been, in fact, representation by Mr. Trubow himself that he will, quote, never pay it. And so we felt compelled to bring this to the Court's attention, because what's the point of having a sanctions motion or a sanctions order if the opposing party is going to never pay it. And so we felt like at this point there is no -- there is no sanction amount that you can issue that's going to actually result in a payment to plaintiff. We have been delayed by this point now, here we are in mid October, this whole

process started a year ago just about, within a month or so of a year ago.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. AUSTIN: As we were -- when we first sought to have these depositions taken. And we finally get them all done, but it takes a motion to compel and it takes an order of sanctions, and we still don't have resolution on all of these issues that were pending nearly a year ago that we have been seeking this entire time.

So we moved for, in this case as well, sanctions and case-ending sanctions. Again, as Ms. Bruss pointed out, we don't take that lightly. We understand, but we just feel like we are at our wits' end. I don't know what we can do. We have tolerated them going to an appeal on an appeal we think is frivolous, and we have tolerated the delays that have taken place.

But my client has been out of pocket much more than 33,000. You'll recall, Your Honor, that you discounted that fee. Unfortunately, it wasn't discounted to my client. So they paid the total sum, but -- and they paid a lot more as we have gone along trying to just get documents here. So they are out and have not been repaid, and now they are informed

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by opposing counsel they are never going to -- or opposing party they are never going to get repaid.

think that motion is pretty clear. I don't know if there is anything that Your Honor would like to specifically talk about. But the case law in that motion is quite clear from the Ninth Circuit. Rule 37(a) sanctions and sanctions for fees, as well as discovery orders, whatever category you want to put this in, none of them fit the criteria required in order to permit the Ninth Circuit to have subject matter jurisdiction over that as a final order. Even if the District Court errs and claims it is a final order, by their own case law, they will not accept jurisdiction over it, because their case law is quite clear it doesn't meet any of that criteria.

It's a little bit of a technical argument. And I laid that out as you go through for each of those categories, but this is pretty clearly a Rule 37(a) sanctions order that was issued by the Court. That's what the order stated for failure -- or as part of a motion to compel, and that is by precedent not appealable interlocutorily. It can be a part of a final judgment. It can be brought up in a final appeal, but it is not appealable at this point in

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time and for a host of reasons. And the key ones are that it defeats the whole point of a sanctions motion to motivate opposing parties to comply with discovery if the -- if the opposing party can completely take all the teeth out of that order and deprive the sitting district court judge, and in this case magistrate judge, of the case and the ability to impose the order, and yet still force the opposing party, in this case plaintiffs and Dr. Trubow, to go forward and incur all the costs of proceeding to trial potentially with a host of sanctions orders that are never paid and waiting until they get to an appeal. At which point we never get anything we're looking for and the case and the ability of the Court to enforce its orders is neutered. And so the Ninth Circuit has made it quite clear in their Supreme Court case law as well. That's just not the rule and it's impermissible to issue a Rule 57 final judgment on a 37(a) sanction. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Austin, what is plaintiff asking the Court to do in terms of supplemental sanctions on that? Is it the case dispositive sanctions; is that what you're asking for?

MR. AUSTIN: It is. I don't know what else the Court can do. I mean, they have refused to pay

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the -- pay the amount. There has been no -- there is an affirmative statement from the opposing party that he is not going to pay it. And so I don't know where else we go.

THE COURT: Well, couldn't the Court --

MR. AUSTIN: Yeah. Go ahead, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Couldn't the Court, Mr. Austin, just defer ruling or action regarding the failure to pay and have it be considered as a set off or part of the final judgment in this case after trial? Why couldn't the Court do that?

MR. AUSTIN: Because the point of Your Honor's order was not to issue a judgment. The point was to motivate the opposing party to comply with discovery. And they -- and we'll get into that in the next section. They have not done that. And there is now -- no sanction has effectively worked to do that. As a result, there is no power that the Court then has. There is no pressure that can be brought to bear on them.

Remember, we are the plaintiff in this action, so we are the one seeking the recovery or clarification that we own the intelligent property assets that we believe are contractually granted to us. And we also believe that we're entitled to

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damages, although frankly, we're not confident that we will recover damages. So an offset of damages is rather immaterial in this case to us. The only sanction that is meaningful to us is clarity that Dr. Morisky has what he thought he had when he signed the settlement agreement, the CR2A.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Austin.

Ms. Ray, what would you like to tell me on this, your client's failure to pay? Has he stated that he will not pay or he cannot pay?

MS. RAY: At the moment, your Honor, he cannot pay. But let's step back. I'd like to deal with a couple of points, and one of -- I want to step back to the beginning about this sanctions motion. But also, I want to say that the matter is still pending at the Ninth Circuit. It's not over there. An appeal was filed. We're waiting on a ruling on the 54(b), and it's still before the Ninth Circuit, the whole thing.

But let's step back to the beginning, how this sanctions motion came to be and what happened in terms of the sanctions being ordered. Mr. Harris was involved --

THE COURT: Ms. Ray, Ms. Ray, let me interrupt

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you. The Court's already made its ruling, and the ruling concluded that Mr. Trubow was obligated to pay the -- you know, the 33,000 and plus by a particular date. So I don't want to really get into the facts or argument related that the Court considered before the Court made that ruling. Is that what you are intending to do here?

MS. RAY: No. No. But I just wanted to mention the circumstances and why all of this has come about. So I just wanted to say I don't want to get into the debate over your ruling or the Court's ruling, but I just wanted to say that Mr. Trubow was seeking some review of that. And that's why that appeal was filed, so that the situation could be reviewed, the order could be reviewed, and we were waiting to -- to hear from this Court in terms of the 54(b) motion. And so that some review at the Ninth Circuit could be held over this -- the sanctions order. And it's still pending.

So we're really -- I'm not aware of Mr. Trubow saying he's never going to pay the sanctions. You know, that's -- possibly, but he says a lot of things, and I think he was just kind of upset over the amount. And so we're -- yeah.

MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, let me weigh in here

too. The fact of the matter is he cannot pay -- this is attorney Brent Harris representing MMAS

Research --

THE COURT: Just a second. Mr. Harris, just a second. Let me go back to Ms. Ray.

Ms. Ray, you didn't -- defendants didn't file any objections to the order awarding fees and costs because you indicated you wanted that reviewed, but you didn't file any objections.

MS. RAY: Yes, we did.

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THE COURT: To Judge Martinez?

MS. RAY: Yes. There was a -- excuse me for interrupting. Yes, we filed an objection, and we asked for it to be lowered and there was some response to that. So that was filed. And then after that, because we had no other option, we did file the appeal. And we've been filing papers with the Ninth Circuit to make sure that appeal gets heard. And if we don't get an order from this Court under 54(b), then -- then we won't be able to sustain that in the Ninth Circuit, but right now, it's still there.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RAY: And so whenever -- whenever plaintiffs file their motion for sanctions, we just said hopefully this Court can put a stay on this

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whole thing until we hear from the Ninth Circuit.

And to be honest, Your Honor, I think your proposal to postpone this until after the trial and the decision is issued in this case and to deal with the sanctions together with the whatever award or whatever the jury finds in the case, I think that resolves things. So I would be -- I would be in accord with your suggestion on that.

THE COURT: Well, yeah. Okay. Well, thank you. It was just trying to probe what other possibilities were. I'm not suggesting that as the direction the Court is taking.

Let me go to Mr. Harris. Mr. Harris, cocounsel with Ms. Ray, what did you want to tell the Court?

MR. HARRIS: Yes, your Honor. The fact of the matter is, doesn't matter what Mr. Trubow said. He cannot pay. That money does not exist. So, you know, the only option is to wait until there is a final judgment on the merits at this point. I don't, you know, see how an IP dispute can be resolved, you know, just because one party cannot afford to pay sanctions.

And, in fact, Your Honor, you've mentioned that the purpose -- or perhaps it was Mr. Austin, the purpose of the sanctions was to ensure that defendant

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complied with discovery, and the fact of the matter is that he has complied since then. So although Mr. Austin is concerned that the Court is neutered in this case, I would say that the Court's decision was effective here.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Harris. All right. Let's move on to the request for production and the interrogatories. Let's take the request for productions first, which was the subject of the Court's order, Docket 124, where the Court ordered defendant to produce documents.

Mr. Austin, just generally, is it your position or the plaintiff that some documents have still not been produced?

MR. AUSTIN: Yes, your Honor. If you will recall the original motion to compel ordered the defendants to produce documents which respond to all 22 requests for production. We received an updated and then a revised response to the request to produce on May 15, 2023, the very deadline. In fact, it was still roughly being put together. When that response was produced, very few documents were yet produced with it. We then received a very ad hoc rolling email of documents being sent to us over the course of the next 10 -- 13 days between May 16th and

May 28th, well after the deadline and too late to really be able to utilize a lot of these documentations in connection with the deposition.

But I will tell you that even in looking at just the response, the response only provides documents, and the only documents that were produced were identified as responsive to only Requests No. 3, No. 5, No. 6, No. 7, No. 9, No. 10, No. 11, No. 12, and No. 21. No other response -- no other request for production was identified in any response for a document. We had 22, so the balance -- to the balance, there was no response provided as with regarding the request for production.

Additionally, none of the documents we received were Bates numbered, and in some cases, we received over 300 documents at once purporting to be responsive to half a dozen questions without any delineation as to what they are responding to. And the requests are not necessarily of this -- you know, requests are not necessarily the same.

So we are trying to go through and email a set of documents that are very rough, not delineated clearly between when one document ends and another begins. No index identifying which document is which, what the title of the document is. There is

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clear question about whether even these documents are complete, because they appear to have been cut from email correspondences in some cases.

And even so, as I can get into in the details, when you go in through each of those documents and compare them against the requests, they are not responsive. But I do want to make one note. In that May 15th response to requests for production, the request itself stops at 12. It produces a response up to 12, and then from 13 through 21, it's missing any response at all. There is no number 13, 14, 15, et cetera, and no response to those requests for production.

We then finally get a response to Request for Production 21. So all you're left with then is what was in the original response that Your Honor indicated was woefully inadequate and to which you compelled them to supplement with additional responses. They disregarded your order in its entirety as to those requests. And those requests were quite significant, just to let you know.

Request No. 12, these are all the documents dealing with their counterclaims and affirmative defenses. We are asking for the documents that support those claims. That's 13 and 14 are documents

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regarding the fifth, sixth, and eighth affirmative defenses, 15 are documents regarding the seventh affirmative defenses, Request 16 are documents regarding the third counterclaim, Request 17 are documents regarding the fourth counterclaim, as well as 18, Document Request 19 are documents regarding the sixth and seventh counterclaims, and Document 20 is with regard to all affirmative defenses and counterclaims that were not otherwise addressed. It was a catch-all request.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Austin, let me make sure I understand. So you are saying Document Request 12 through 20, 12 through 20 --

MR. AUSTIN: Not 12. 13 through 20. 13 through 20.

THE COURT: Okay. 13 through 20 defendant has not responded to after defendant received the Court's order on April 27, 2023. You've received no additional documents for those requests, Document Requests 13 through 20; is that correct?

MR. AUSTIN: That's correct, your Honor. There is no documents that are identified as responsive to any of those. And in the actual discovery document in which you identify what document you are providing, those numbers are not even included in the

response. They skip from 12 to 21, 22.

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THE COURT: 12 to 21 or 12 to --

MR. AUSTIN: 12 to 21. Excuse me. They skip from 12. So they go 12 and then the next response is 21.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. All right. So they -- the series is Document Request 13 to Document Request 20, those are the ones for which plaintiff is stating you've not received any supplemental documents; is that correct?

MR. AUSTIN: That is.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. AUSTIN: And then as I said, as a general rule, this was very difficult and cumbersome to go into. But as we got into them -- and I'll just kind of give you another general. This is also in our motion in a general fashion, but I can go through these granularly with you, you know, request by request.

They are just the documents they submitted to their amended complaint. They are their self-serving documents they had been trying to utilize in their own pleadings or in their motions, so they are cherry-picked. They are picking, you know, a license discussion and, you know, process for one license

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agreement that they think gives them some grounds to move against Dr. Trubow, but they are ignoring the hundreds of license agreements that they acknowledge in the CR2A that MMAS has entered into with third parties. We have no documents with regard to those licenses. None. And yet they identify them as an exhibit to the CR2A. This is a list of all of our -- of all the parties with whom we have license agreements.

So we have an idea of at least as of the time the CR2A was entered into, this was the -- this was what MMAS was doing. These are the license agreement that they had with people. What we don't know is what happened subsequent to that, because I don't know that we've got into much of the merits here, but CR2A provided them the opportunity to go out and secure settlements and file lawsuits with Dr. Morisky as a participant in the lawsuit, which would be required because he is the copyright holder, against infringers of the Morisky widget, which they claim to have copyright of. So it would have to be somebody who was already a licensee. That would be the only person who would likely have access to that widget. We clarify that in discovery. That widget is otherwise unavailable to anybody generally.

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would have to have received a copy of it pursuant to a prior license agreement of some sort so -- or prior negotiation.

So we already know there is a number of license agreements out there for which we received none of the actual agreements. These were all done by Trubow and his lawyers while the lawyers represented both parties, and at times might communicate with Dr. Morisky. It was expected and understood that this was, as part of the compromise, this was driven by Mr. Trubow and MMAS. So that's what I'm kind of telling you there. We know there is a lot that is missing because of that, and we know that these documents they produced, many of them are just nonresponsive.

And they are extraordinarily duplicative. I mean, we are talking about hundreds of pages that are copied two -- two to five times. I mean, you will find the CR2A, which is 140-something pages all together, multiple times is recopied and resubmitted. My emails and my discussions that were -- that were -- not my emails but there was a letter that was sent out on behalf of my client to licensees to say, hey, here is the status, that has been produced multiple times because that has become a tar baby

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issue for the defendant in this case. So a lot of these things are our own, are our client's email correspondence back and forth but are not responsive to the key requests we are asking for. And so with the Court's indulgence, I'm happy to go through the specific requests.

THE COURT: You know, I think what I'd like to do is hear from Ms. Ray just generally, but I'm looking at the clock and we need to take our break for the earthquake drill that is going to happen here shortly.

So, Ms. Ray, when we get back I just -- I would like to hear from you as to, in particular, whether you and your client produced any documents responding to Document Requests 13 through 20, and then I'd like to get your general argument on this motion regarding your client's response to those requests for production.

And it looks like, Counsel, that we'll probably have to go through each one and each request for production and just go through it each one at a time. In fact, that's probably what I would plan to do after I hear from Ms. Ray about the gap on 13 to 20.

So, Counsel, let's -- court will be in recess. We will reconvene at 10:30. And we will see you back

here then.

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Counsel, I don't know whether you want to try to meet and confer during that gap. You certainly can. I mean, I will be in the breakout room, but maybe if you don't think that is productive, then we will just reconvene at 10:30. All right.

Would you like an opportunity to discuss the issues, Mr. Austin, on this particular request for production or discovery, or would that not be fruitful?

MR. AUSTIN: I don't think it would be fruitful at this point, your Honor. It would take way more than ten minutes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. AUSTIN: To try and go through that process. And at this point, we've had a year of seeking these documents.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. With that -- all right. With that, the Court will be in recess and see you back here at 10:30. Thank you.

(A recess was taken.)

THE CLERK: Good morning. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington is now again in session. The Honorable David W. Christel presiding.

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THE COURT: Just waiting for everyone to get
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       back to the Zoom.
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              MS. RAY: I'm back. I was disconnected, so I'm
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       back.
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              THE COURT: Ms. Ray, I can't see your video.
              MR. HARRIS: And for the record, your Honor, it
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       looks like we've had a new party join us.
              MS. RAY: That's me.
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              MR. HARRIS: No. It's some guy from the moving
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       party, I think. Maybe they just changed their name.
              MS. RAY: I think that's me.
11
12
              MR. HARRIS: Looks like Dr. Morisky perhaps.
13
              THE COURT: Mr. Austin, I don't have you on
14
       video. Ms. Bruss, could you maybe email him and --
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              MS. BRUSS: I was just on the phone with him
16
       about two minutes ago. So I think he -- he was
       logging on when I spoke to him, so he might be having
17
       a technical problem, but he was just in his office
18
19
       two minutes ago.
20
              THE COURT: Okay. We will give him a few
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       moments.
22
              Ms. Ray, we are still waiting for your video?
23
       Okay. There you are.
24
              MS. RAY: There I am. Okay.
25
              THE COURT: We're waiting for Mr. Austin to
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come back. And I'll be right back in a moment.
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 2
              Mr. Austin, are you with us?
 3
              MR. AUSTIN: I am. Just -- just racing back,
 4
       Your Honor.
 5
              THE COURT: Okay. Good. Thank you. Thank
       you. All right.
 6
7
             We're back on the record. Case No. 21-1301.
8
       Our court reporter is with us. Thank you,
9
       Ms. Turner. Or let me just confirm with Ms. Turner.
10
       Ms. Turner, are you with us and are you able to see
11
       and hear everybody?
12
              THE COURT REPORTER: Yes, Your Honor. I am
       here and I am able to see and hear.
13
14
              THE COURT: Okay. Great. Thank you,
15
       Ms. Turner.
              We also have it's identified as a Donald M.
16
17
       Who -- is that a client?
              MR. AUSTIN: Yes, your Honor. That would be my
18
19
       client. That's Dr. Donald Morisky.
20
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Thank you.
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              All right. Let's go back to where we left.
22
       And, Ms. Ray, first question for you is whether you
23
       and your client responded to the Document Requests 13
       to 20 after the Court entered the -- after the Court
24
25
       entered the order directing him to respond on or
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before I think it was May 15th. Ms. Ray.
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 2
              MS. RAY: (Audio disruption.)
 3
              I can't hear you, Ms. Ray.
                       (Audio disruption.)
 4
              MS. RAY:
              THE COURT: Ms. Ray, you are not coming
 5
 6
       through.
7
              MS. RAY: (Audio disruption.) Can you hear me?
 8
              THE COURT: Nope.
9
              MS. RAY: Can you hear me?
10
              THE COURT:
                          Nope.
11
              MS. RAY: Okay. (Audio disruption.)
12
              THE COURT: We can't hear you, Ms. Ray. Do you
       want to maybe log off and log back in and see if that
13
14
       works for you. Maybe turn off your video.
15
              MS. RAY: (Audio disruption.)
16
              THE COURT: Ms. Ray, maybe just turn off your
17
       video.
18
                       (Audio disruption.)
              MS. RAY:
19
              THE COURT: Sometimes if you turn off your
20
       video, you can just participate audibly if you want
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       to do that. Why don't you try that, Ms. Ray?
22
              MS. RAY: Okay.
23
              THE COURT: Ms. Ray, are you able to turn off
24
       your video? We are not hearing you at all.
25
              MS. RAY: (Audio disruption.)
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THE COURT: Looks like Ms. Ray disconnected. 1 2 Mr. Harris, are you -- I know you and Ms. Ray 3 have split up the arguments today on the motions. Are you in a position to argue this motion on behalf 4 5 of the defendants? 6 MR. HARRIS: I can, your Honor. I was not 7 directly involved in the production of documents or 8 any responses to discovery, so I -- I know our 9 position on it, but I don't -- I can't speak directly 10 to any specific questions. THE COURT: All right. Well, let's -- we will 11 12 just wait for Ms. Ray to see if she can reconnect. 13 MS. RAY: Hello. I might be back. 14 THE COURT: Okay. There you are. 15 MS. RAY: I went to my laptop and I got in 16 better. So I apologize for that so I'd like to go 17 forward. 18 THE COURT: All right. Please proceed, 19 Ms. Ray. 20 MS. RAY: All right. On the -- you asked me 2.1 about the document -- the responses to the document 22 requests. So the situation is I'm not sure what 23 happened to those responses, but what I did with the 24 client, with Mr. Trubow is I --25 THE COURT: Wait, wait. Did you -- I'd

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like to get your answer to the question. Did you and your client respond to Document Requests 13 to 20 by the May 15, 2023, deadline or not?

MS. RAY: Yes, I believe we did, Your Honor. I sat down with Mr. Trubow and went through every document request and we made a response. Now, what happened to the actual stated responses, I -- I'm not -- I'm not sure. But we did respond to all of the requests and uncovered every possible document that we could produce on those categories.

Some of the categories, your Honor, Mr. Trubow said that he doesn't have documents because they are with the joint counsel who represented both plaintiff and defendant. Many of the licensing documents from the past are in the hands of those joint representation lawyers which are each equally accessible by plaintiff. So, A, he doesn't have files on them. They are with the lawyers, and also, plaintiff can get them from those -- those parties. So there was nothing produced there.

There may be other categories that plaintiff is seeking that is -- there is nothing there. But I went through document by document request and produced everything that is available.

Now, as far as that 13 to 21, I don't know how

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they got missed in terms of the response documents.

If need be, we can go through those and identify
whether or not they have been addressed. The second
thing is, on that -- that's a topic of what documents
have been produced.

So I wanted to be very thorough. There was a couple of sets of production, and some of it may have been duplicative. That is because we were trying to produce everything possible.

Now, first, I contacted Mr. Austin and asked him how he would like the production done. And he said, as long as they were done by categories and presented to him in terms of what areas the documents related to, that would be okay. I thought we did a pretty good job of that, although they weren't Bates numbered, that is true. They weren't Bates numbered, but they were presented by categories and there was nothing that was privileged to identify. So there was no privilege log presented. And everything that we have was produced. And one more thing. I — that's all. That's all for now.

THE COURT: That's all for now?

MS. RAY: Yeah. You may have more questions.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I just want to go back and clarify. You said you didn't know what happened

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to your responses to Requests for Production 13 to 20 but --

MS. RAY: We did go -- within getting the production together, I did go through all of the document production requests and got documents from defendant on every category. So if need be, if we need to go through those requests again and make sure the documents are produced on those areas, that's acceptable to me. But I -- I don't have any -- any answer on whether -- on what happened to those actual responses. I don't know.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Austin, how would you like to respond to that?

MR. AUSTIN: Well, I -- it's the first time
I've heard that there was even a discussion with
counsel. They had come up with documents responsive.
The reality is we are now so far past the deadlines
here. The intent of the Court's May 15th deadline
was to afford plaintiff an opportunity, although very
brief one, to review documents before going forward
with depositions that were the next week. And we
never got those documents, and we had to go forward
with depositions without the benefit of them.

In any event we, even in the rolling production that was produced came too late, were too close to

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the deposition for them to be of any use to us in those depositions.

Let me just address a few things that she raised. I think it's important to understand, pursuant to the parties' agreement, the joint counsel was joint counsel, but they were entirely controlled by, retained through the efforts of Mr. Trubow. We did not have their contact information, unless that was provided to us from Mr. Trubow or we received an email from one of the joint counsels.

In our request for interrogatories, we asked for all of the contact information for all of the joint counsel. We received no contact information for any of the joint counsel. So to say that we can subpoena them is impossible. We might be able to subpoena a few from our own research, but that was not -- they were not as easily accessible to us and just so you are aware, there were -- the vast majority of a lot of these license agreements occurred overseas in France, Chile, China, Korea, Japan. This is where the counsel were too. So these are not easily findable joint counsel to subpoena documents from. That's why we asked for their specific contact information. And we never got that information until post the depositions and we just

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never got it. Just we got a list of a handful of names, and that's all we got. But no way to know how to get ahold of them. Not even -- not even an indication of which firms they were with, if they were with a firm.

So then with regard to the discussion about the rolling production, I told -- you know, Ms. Ray is correct. I informed her we would accommodate a rolling production, but she needed to, quote, identify the document that it was -- or document request that the document was responding to. I -you know, that's what my response was. I did not anticipate nor did I authorize her to send me batches of documents that were responsive to a half dozen requests. That is in -- that is not in compliance with the rules. That's not what is anticipated by the rules. That is not how you practice. And it's for good reasons. It's impossible for us to then go through that and figure out amongst a half dozen different responses to requests which document is responding to one or the other when in the response itself there is no identification of any document that is responsive to that request, zero, in every response.

THE COURT: Let me -- let me just interrupt you

there for a moment, Mr. Austin.

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Ms. Ray, is that correct? Do you agree that the documents you provided were not designated by specific requests for production? Do you agree with that?

MS. RAY: Partially. There was -- I identified the document requests that they related to, but then there were groups of documents that had a general topic, and I identified that general topic for Mr. Austin. So there was some identification about the requests that they related to and some -- some identification as to the topic, because they would have been, like, a bunch of interrogatory -- document requests that they were responding to. So, for example, here are emails relating to the licensing program. That kind of thing. They are more topically identified.

THE COURT: All right. Back to you, Mr. Austin, if you want to continue.

MR. AUSTIN: Yeah, I will just respond to that one quick question, and then if you want to go through each request, we can do that.

THE COURT: Yeah, why don't you response to that topic. Let's go through the requests or I can try to narrow down each side's specific position on

this thing.

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MR. AUSTIN: I think it would be beneficial, as I go through this, for the Court to understand what we received and what we saw. We would receive from Ms. Ray, and initially we were getting -- there were some emails were going to me and some were going to Ms. Bruss. We finally, just said, look. You've got to get them to both of us so we can see them. And she did.

But what we were seeing, and I've got all those emails stored as a separate caption, but the email would say something like this. It would be "first email regarding document production, five documents regarding Morisky widget agreement." So she would send me a document. I would go, okay. That one is going to be responsive to document five, widget agreements, but then when I would get into it, it's -- it's not -- it's not the list. Document Request No. 5 was a request for all of the agreements, and I would find one or two agreements and then a whole bunch of emails about that agreement. And I learned very quickly that these are not documents that were comprehensive of all the agreements. These were documents that they had addressed in their counterclaim and that they had not

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produced prior to the deadline for their own production of documents. And so they were trying to get them in through our requests for production in support of their counterclaim or their affirmative defenses. And that's when it became very clear is what was happening there.

So then I would get a document that was an email back on the 16th of May, a day after the deadline, and I got quite a batch of them on that day. But I -- you know, with regard to -- let's see. Here's another one. Response to production -- so I've got a Daiichi attorney conference is the kind of title, email 5RSP11, 12 docs.

Daiichi is one of the licensees, so I'm getting kind of this vague reference to licensees, but then I've got about 80 to 100 documents that flow out of that that are supposedly applying to two different categories or two different requests with no delineation and no Bates numbering to identify them. And this is just only in the email that is coming to me. It's not identified in the actual response to the requests for production.

So if you go through each request for production, their answer in every single case predominantly is these documents have or will be

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produced. And then there is no listing of the documents that have been produced or that will be produced. And there is no -- even when they sent us a revised response, which I think they sent on the 24th or 25th of May, ten days late, we did not still get an identification of any of the documents that have been produced or allegedly produced in response to those requests. So there is no way for us to readily identify amongst the about 500 documents that got rolled out to us which response they were addressed to.

The work was put on us to go through those 500 documents. And in some cases, I mean, literally I will point to Request 5, right. The Request 6, Request 7, Request 21, all the documents that they claim were responsive to those categories, some 400 documents, were part of one email of documents that were attached that just said responsive to Requests 5, 6, 7, and 21. That's improper. That's not responsive. And there is no listing of the documents by Bates number.

The rules are designed so that it is not the job of the party that is doing the requesting to try to divine what the producing party believes the document responds to in the question. That is their

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job to specifically identify by request themselves which document is responsive to those, which would be very cumbersome for them to do because not one of those documents is Bates numbered. Many of them have no numbering. Many appear to have been cut and paste from emails into Word documents. Some were forwarded and continued to have forwarding information that may -- may be irrelevant, so they were in very bad shape as far as evidence is concerned. They were going to incur enormous challenges to put somebody on the stand and go through and delineate what this is and whether or not it has been tampered with, because there is clear evidence that it was cut and paste or pieces of it were cut and paste and put into a Word document.

And we also know, from having looked at these documents, that they literally -- that the work was done predominately, appears to us, by Mr. Trubow himself, and he prepared these and assembled them as a package and then forwarded them to his attorneys to be produced. We know that because the forwarding email was included in some cases.

So that's the nature that we're trying to deal with here.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. AUSTIN: And it's impossible. It's impossible for us to clearly understand what is going on. And I can go through them in detail, but my point is I just want to make it clear that there was no grant of just a general category. What she did was not what I had requested. I requested identify the documents responsive to each request. The standard rule.

THE COURT: Right. All right. Thank you, Mr. Austin.

Ms. Ray, anything else you'd like to tell the Court on how you and your client responded to the requests for productions?

MS. RAY: Well, I would like to add that I did try to be as thorough as possible in getting documents on every category that was requested, and I sent them and identified the categories or the areas. And as far as what was produced, I believe everything was responded to and there is nothing more.

Organization-wise, I thought I was doing what Mr. Austin had said. And I hear now that he would like to have more specificity into what the -- what documents responded to what category.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. RAY: Yes. That's my comment.

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THE COURT: Ms. Ray, do you believe that you and your client responded to the requests for productions in compliance with the rules of discovery, in particular by designating which documents connect with which requests for production? Do you think you've done that?

MS. RAY: I've done that for some of the documents. For others, I just added categories of document areas, because I wanted to make sure we had thoroughly covered those areas. For example, licensing-related documents. I didn't want to leave anything not produced. And some -- as Mr. Austin said, I would identify first the documents that responded to categories under the federal rules, but then I sent a lot more documents that were just topically related. Those things were not identified by document request. Those were just categories of documents to make sure that everything was -- they had everything.

I was really trying to get Mr. Austin documents to use for his deposition. And what he did in the deposition was he took the documents and then identified the categories and used them for questioning, and I thought we were good. So I'm kind of surprised to hear that it didn't work for him,

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because it seemed to work for him for the deposition.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Austin, I will give you a final response on this topic, then I want to move on to the interrogatory requests.

MR. AUSTIN: Sure. Let me just give you a sampling here of the documents that were absolutely not responsive to anything. An email that says "Exhibit 11 Barclays Cancer Institute." 80 pages.

THE COURT: What is your document -- what is your docket? Do you have a docket citation?

MR. AUSTIN: No. These were her production, so she would send me an email.

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

MR. AUSTIN: And attached to it would be a document entitled Exhibit 11 or Exhibit 12, Exhibit 16, Exhibit -- or 94 exhibits, second-amended counterclaim. I mean, they literally gave us the documents they had already produced in their counterclaim with the exhibit numbers still attached to the documents. These were not responsive to our questions. These were documents they wanted to have to utilize in their case because they didn't produce them before discovery closed. I mean, that's really what this was.

So that's my -- that's kind of the affront

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here. So the majority of the documents come in this fashion. That's why I say they are not in a way where they are responsive to my requests, and the ones that purport to respond to our requests are simply the same thing but only cherry-picking the document they think would help bolster their case. This was clearly produced by -- you know, put together but Mr. Trubow with the mindset of how do I get the stuff in that I want to win my case on without really seeking anything that was responsive to ours.

And just to go into kind of a little bit of the detail on this, as we didn't go through granularly, but the financial documents are critical in our case. We asked for all of the financials. We got -- we got two tax returns and a single -- and one of the tax returns is not complete. It's a one-page cover. And only for the years '21 and '22, not for the range that we requested the documentation for. So we asked for documents and -- that were regarding financials and the response in both the interrogatories and in the requests for production was we don't have them. They are not in our possession, even though they identify their banking institutions.

But that goes back to the laptop, because this

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is where I came back in the deposition and asked Mr. Trubow where -- you know, where are the documents that would have all of the financials or all of the license agreements? And his response was, well, I don't have them anymore. And ultimately we were able to draw out that what he meant by that was they were on the laptop.

And I said, well, can you produce the laptop?

And initially, he said, well, the hard drive is

broken. Well, can you produce it so we can check

that? Well, you can't -- I don't have it.

I mean, it's -- I will tell you, the court reporter kind of chuckled in the course of his responses as the response became a little more of the dog ate my homework as we went along, until he finally said, well, no, it -- it broke and so I threw it away, right after he was supposed to have appeared and missed his deposition on that weekend. So this is where we're looking at this record.

So I go through, no financials we will produce. That's Request No. 9 and 10. We asked for all the litigation documents that were -- all the complaints, all the settlement agreements that were filed both with Dr. Morisky and we suspected and we found on our own complaints and settlement agreements that were

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entered without Dr. Morisky, in express violation, we believe, of the requirements of the settlement agreement. Those document requests go from -- are 5, 6, 7, and 8. In all cases, the response was, we don't have them. They are with our joint counsel, which were not identified and no contact information was provided.

That is core to our case. How do we show that they violated the CR2A by entering into settlement agreements, license agreements, and filing suits in which we were required to be paid a percentage of whatever return was obtained if we do not have any of the documents or the vast majority of them? All we have are the settlement agreements or the lawsuits that were problematic, and I there are about a handful of those, because those we became aware of and we raised objections to the terms because the terms incorrectly stated that Dr. Morisky didn't own his own IP. That was what it was. Those -- and those are the documents we got, which we already knew of because they were attached to their amended complaint under the same document. So that's -- I mean, this is the kind of thing we're looking at.

We finally did get the code, but let me tell you about that, because again, this is a copyright

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case, and they were alleging we were infringing their code. So we asked for a production of the code. We initially got a document we could not open.

Eventually, we were able to get a document we could open, but that did not happen until after the depositions had commenced in late May. And by which time that code, which is -- I don't know how many lines, but it's 500 pages if you print it out, or more, there is no way for me to have had somebody with proficiency in reading code to go through that and help me prepare for a deposition.

And then when we got to the deposition of the 30(b)(6) witness, which was Mr. Trubow, in which one of the topics was speak to what parts of the code are your original material that has been inputted into --put in and that is the subject of the copyright as opposed to the material that is original to Dr.

Morisky so that we can see what is derivative and transformative, because they were alleging in their complaint that the code was transformative. And Dr. Morisky -- or Mr. Trubow responded he could not speak to the code. He cannot read the code. He was utterly unprepared and incapable of providing any testimony as to that -- that request. So that's a whole other section we haven't gone into, but that's

part of our motion. We did not have a 30(b)(6) witness who could speak to all 14 topics. We had one who could speak to two or three of the 14. And we had provided the references in the deposition in which Mr. Trubow frankly acknowledges, I can't speak to that. I can't speak to that. I'm not prepared to talk to that on all of those.

Request No. 1, identify all of the documents responsive to the interrogatory by interrogatory number. I can tell you from looking at all of the emails that were sent to me, there were three emails that identified an interrogatory, and the responses were -- I got one that just said interrogatory responses with no delineation at all of what response it was responding to. I got another one that said response to Interrogatory 11, but then it -- it only included Daiichi and Racia [phonetic], 2 of 100 plus licensees that were the subject of legal actions. That's what request 11 was to provide us documents with response to.

And I got one -- I got another one for Rog 11 and I got a final email for rog -- for Interrogatory Responses 5, 6, and 9. So of the total of interrogatory requests that we made, and there were

23, I think we got specifically identified four.
One, two, three, four.

THE COURT: And when you say specifically identified, that means that the information --

MR. AUSTIN: At least were in the title of the email that was sent to me, but no document was identified. It was just these documents are generally responsive to Interrogatories 5, 6, and 9.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. AUSTIN: Because the documents that are -you know, it's the response to what was requested in
No. 1, these are the documents that are responsive to
Interrogatories 5, 6, and 9. But when I get into
them, I realize they are utterly inadequate. They
are not responsive and not complete. And I have not
gone through every single one of these, but we have
gone -- I have through this. It is painful and it is
extraordinarily time consuming.

But the bottom line is at day's end, we don't have a production that meets the rules that is usable. I literally had to go myself and have my team in the few hours that we had available the day before the deposition and the day of the deposition take some of their documents and Bates number them so that I could create a comprehensible record on the

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deposition. But by no means did I -- you know, is that comprehensive. That's just what we could quickly grab in the rush we could do when these documents came in literally, you know, right before we're going forward on the deposition.

So this is the frustration. We're -- we've been a year into this, and we still don't have the critical documents that are at the core of our case. What are the license agreements? What are the settlement agreements? How much money was there? Was Dr. Morisky a part of each of these agreements? We have nothing comprehensive, no list, nothing of that nature. And we know it's much more than four or five or six or seven of these arguments, because it's listed as hundreds in the actual agreement that they have licenses with. So we don't have any financials as a result of that either. We don't have any records.

Their response is we can't get them. And yet they can identify their own bank, but they are asking us to go subpoena their bank after discovery is closed when they finally are compelled to produce a response to identify their bank. Then they say, oh, here's our bank, but we don't have the records because we didn't go get them and now you can't

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because discovery is closed. Thanks, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Austin.

Ms. Ray, what else would you like to tell the Court regarding these requests for productions and your client's response to discovery?

MS. RAY: Your Honor, thank you. Yes, we produced everything that we possibly could and identified what I could according to interrogatories. I thought we did a responsible job and identified the responses to interrogatories. But then, as I said, I provided more. And therein lies, I guess, the problem. I sent a lot of extra documents and they're -- they're -- they are in topics rather than identifying interrogatories. That's -- I just threw these other documents in in case Mr. Austin wanted to use them in his deposition. So there I guess is the problem.

I identified responsive documents by interrogatory to the extent possible. One of the problems here is that many of the documents that they are seeking for their case don't exist. There is very little on licensing and financial records, and a lot of it is equally available to them by subpoena through the third-party lawyers. And so we're stuck with in between. We don't have any documents to

produce.

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And they have questions about things that just is part of their, quote, case, but they don't exist. So there we are. I -- we're in a position where we can't produce anything related to a question they may have and that doesn't mean we're not responsive.

It's just we don't have anything. So thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. BRUSS: Your Honor, may I cite to one part of the record on this issue? We submitted to the Court where Mr. Trubow testified in his deposition that one of his attorneys had given him a Dropbox full of documents that was so large he didn't download it. He said, "When I asked him for the stuff post CR2A, he gave me a Dropbox. It had so much stuff in it I just didn't have time to go through it."

And then Mr. Austin says, "Have you produced any of that information from the Dropbox in this litigation?"

Answer: "The Dropbox is expired. I didn't even download it. It was so big."

This is at Document 155-8 and that is Mr. Trubow's testimony. So he did have documents.

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He just didn't want to look at them and didn't bother to turn them over and didn't tell us about them until his deposition. He also testified that he eventually got bank statements from some of his banks that he gave to his bookkeeper but never produced to us.

So this argument that they produced everything they have is contradicted by Mr. Trubow's own testimony under oath.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel.

Let's move on to the final topic for today in this hearing, which is we got a motion to stay and an argument regarding the current scheduling order and trial date.

On the plaintiff's side, Mr. Austin, can this case proceed to trial on November 27th before Judge Martinez?

You are on mute.

MS. BRUSS: You are on mute, Chris.

MR. AUSTIN: I'm going to pass the baton to my colleague on this one, because she is the one that was prepared to address this issue.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Ms. Bruss.

MS. BRUSS: Thank you. I feel like it's fairly clear from everything we've discussed today, no, because we don't have -- I mean, we've got a motion

in limine deadline of October 26th. We don't have documents, we don't have -- I mean, no, we don't. If the next step is going to be requiring us to undertake the expense of sending subpoenas to defendant's agents to obtain documents that he should have produced, I don't know how long that's going to take. But no, we are not prepared to move forward because we don't have the core evidence that we should have. We should have had a year ago. So no.

THE COURT: How about on behalf of the defendants, Ms. Ray?

MS. RAY: Actually, we've been preparing the same time period and we're ready to go. We're ready for November 27th.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Now, possibly, if you had a motion to stay, what else would you like to tell the Court on that motion to stay, Ms. Bruss? Are you -- you are asking for case dispositive sanctions. If the Court doesn't do that, then I'm interpreting your argument as being that you want to stay the case or continue the trial date; is that what you're looking for?

MS. BRUSS: Your Honor, at this point what we would be seeking in the event the Court decided that this case can somehow go forward, we are asking for

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an extension of all of the deadlines by a substantial amount of time so that we can reopen discovery. We don't believe that defendants should be able to reopen discovery. They've had ample opportunity. But we will need to reopen to send out subpoenas, apparently.

We would ask that the Court require defense to pay for those, although I don't see that actually being effective. But if we're going to move forward, we need additional time, so we would want to -- we would ask the Court to extend the deadlines at least six months for completion of discovery, further depositions. I believe we're going to need to depose probably Mr. Mackey. He seems to be the only one that knows about source code on defense side. So conducting additional deposition, sending out subpoenas, any further discovery that's resulting from those and then motion practice after that.

In theory, a lot of this case could have been dealt with on dispositive motions, but we couldn't file a dispositive motion without documents and without discovery. So we would like an extension of the dispositive motion deadline after the new discovery deadline so that we can try to resolve this case without spending a lot of the jury's time that

doesn't need to be spent.

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THE COURT: Understand that.

MR. AUSTIN: Your Honor, just if I may, the request for a stay was to stay the proceedings of the case until the Court ruled on these motions that are before you today.

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. Okay. All right,

Counsel. I think we've been through the topics for

today. Is there anything on behalf of the plaintiff

you think you would like to address for the Court,

Mr. Austin, Ms. Bruss?

MR. AUSTIN: I think we have covered much more than I thought we might be doing today, so I don't think there is anything more from us at this point to bring to the Court's attention.

THE COURT: All right. How about you, Ms. Ray or Mr. Harris, on behalf of the defendants?

MS. RAY: I will go first. Thank you, your Honor. Thank you for the Court spending the time on these motions and making the Court's effort to resolve the issues that we were kind of wondering and wondering what the resolution would be and we appreciate what you've done today. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Harris, anything?

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MR. HARRIS: Yes, Your Honor. Just final word for me, defense does request that if you do extend the deadlines for plaintiffs that you also extend the deadlines for defendants, as there was some other discovery disputes that, you know, we would like to engage in as well or at least hopefully not disputes but some discovery that we were not able to complete. And that's all. Thank you for your time this morning.

MS. BRUSS: Your Honor, may I make one point.

To the extent the defendant's are asking for an extension of discovery on their end, we would like the opportunity to brief a response.

THE COURT: Right. The Court doesn't have a request from the defendants that's been filed to reopen discovery, so that's not even before the Court at this time.

MR. HARRIS: Yes, your Honor. Ms. Bruss just said that she requested that the Court extend discovery for plaintiffs exclusively, so I was merely responding to that statement.

THE COURT: Yeah, and the plaintiffs have actually filed a motion to that effect. I think that's included in what they submitted as an alternative request, that they be given an

opportunity to conduct -- to reopen discovery, so 1 2 that actually is before the Court. MR. HARRIS: Understood, your Honor. 3 MS. RAY: Your Honor, we would like the 4 5 opportunity to file a motion to extend discovery as well if -- if there is an extension of time for 6 7 discovery for the plaintiffs, we would like the 8 opportunity to move equally for time. 9 THE COURT: Court's not going to make a ruling 10 on that, Ms. Ray, at this point. You know, you are 11 always free to file whatever motions you think are 12 appropriate. The Court would consider any motions at 13 the time that you get them filed and they are ready 14 for the Court's consideration. 15 MS. RAY: Thank you, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: With that, Counsel, thank you for 17 your arguments this afternoon. The Court is in 18 Thank you. recess. 19 (Court adjourned.) 20 21 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATE 1 2 3 STATE OF WASHINGTON SS COUNTY OF LEWIS 4 5 I, JESSICA L. TURNER, Certified Court Reporter 6 7 for the State of Washington, do hereby certify: 8 That the foregoing verbatim report of 9 proceedings consisting of 86 pages was reported by me 10 and reduced to typewriting by means of computer-aided transcription; 11 12 That said transcript is a full, true, and correct transcript of my shorthand notes of the 13 14 proceedings heard via Zoom videoconference before 15 Hon. David W. Christel on October 19, 2023, for the 16 U.S. District Court, Western District of Washington; 17 That I am not a relative or employee of counsel 18 or to either of the parties herein or otherwise 19 interested in said proceedings. 20 Signed this 22nd day of May, 2024. 2.1 22 23 Turner Jessica L. 2.4 CCR No. 3187 25